



**Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN  
Geneva**

**Statement by Ambassador Khalil Hashmi at the Plenary Meeting of the  
Conference on Disarmament with initial inputs by Nuclear Disarmament  
Verification experts**

**Agenda Item 1: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament  
15 August 2023**

**Mr. President,**

Thank you for convening this meeting. We would also like to thank the panelists for their presentations.

**Mr. President,**

We deeply appreciate the manner in which Mr. Jörn Osmundsen, using his diplomatic skills and experience, steered the deliberations of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NDV) issues leading to adoption of a consensus report in May 2023.

Norway's stewardship was also instrumental in securing the adoption of a consensus report by the first GGE.

A Pakistani expert has actively participated in and contributed constructively to the work of both GGEs.

I will, therefore, keep my remarks brief and only highlight our principled approach towards nuclear disarmament verification issues.

**Mr. President,**

Verification does not have an independent existence unless it is integrated into a treaty as a tool to ensure compliance. Similarly, nuclear disarmament verification can best be addressed in the context of a specific treaty regime. It cannot be pursued meaningfully either an abstract or as an end in itself.

It goes without saying verification would constitute a vital instrument to foster adherence to and compliance with any future agreement(s) on nuclear disarmament. However, for such a verification mechanism, its tools and modalities to work effectively, it would require negotiations and agreement among all parties.

Having said this, we see value in a *conceptual* discussion as has been the case in the GGEs which can help develop a better common understanding on the scale of complexities and challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification and the general measures that would be required to address them.

### **Mr. President**

The two GGEs undertook an initial, largely political examination of the issue of NDV, in order to identify principles and parameters that can guide treaty negotiators in the future. Accordingly, the focus in these Groups was on general concepts and guidelines, and not on specific measures and/or scenarios.

The specifics of NDV would be treaty dependent and can only be determined within the context of that treaty. Generic models can neither be prejudged, nor developed in advance.

Keeping this in view, the first GGE identified seven overarching general principles as well as seven key conclusions that should guide future negotiators. The report of the first GGE also reaffirmed the already-agreed principles that are laid out in the consensus Final Document of the 1978 First Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I), as well as the 16 Principles of Verification agreed by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) in 1988.

### **Mr. President**

The conclusions reached by the first GGE in its consensus report acknowledged, inter alia, that “*the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament will be determined on a case-by-case basis in the context of the negotiations of legally-binding agreements in the area of nuclear disarmament*”.

The second GGE was able to develop a working definition of nuclear disarmament verification, while highlighting that it was not prejudging future negotiations and agreements. It also reiterated that the “*scope of nuclear disarmament verification activities will be contingent upon the disarmament commitments and obligations a State has undertaken.*”

The discussions on capacity building efforts in the second GGE were extremely useful in highlighting how interested States could be involved in work on NDV, at a level of their own choosing, while respecting existing mechanisms and arrangements.

Most importantly, the Group recognized the utility of continuing work on NDV including further deliberations on its conceptual aspects.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> GGE has recommended that UN Member States, as well as relevant bodies of the international disarmament machinery, in accordance with their respective mandates, consider its report.

In this context, we support consideration of the GGE's report by the CD under agenda item 1.

**Mr. President**

Let me conclude by highlighting that the two GGEs have adopted substantive reports after holding detailed deliberations. All States now need to study, examine and share feedback on the contents of these reports before a determination is made to consider further deliberations on conceptual aspects of NDV.

I thank you.

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